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The Meaning and Implications of « Unlawfull » 
in Canada's Abortion Law 
Paul J. MlCALLEF* 
Comme le titre le suggère, l'auteur analyse la signification et les 
implications de « illégalement » et « unlawfully» dans les versions française et 
anglaise du Code criminel du Canada, ce qui l'amène à mettre en doute la 
justesse du terme français. Il soutient qu'une traduction fidèle de « unlawfully » 
en français serait « sans autorisation légitime », et il poursuit en discutant des 
implications éthiques du terme dans le contexte de la législation canadienne sur 
l'avortement telle qu'était avant sa révision en 1969 et de son rôle possible dans 
la législation sur l'avortement. 
Pour soutenir son argument, il recourt à /'Offences Against the Person 
Act britannique de 1861 et à l'affaire célèbre de Rex v. Bourne (1938), et à la 
manière dont ceux-ci furent appliqués dans les pratiques légale et médicale 
canadienne. 
Finalement, l'auteur concentre son attention sur la supériorité du langage 
éthique au langage socio-économique ou médical dans une législation sur 
l'avortement, et il souscrit à une législation sur l'avortement exprimée en 
termes éthiques. 
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Introduction 
It is common practice that when a particular law has been drafted and 
accepted in one language and eventually translated into another, it is the text 
of the original language that prevails in the event that conflicts of under-
standing and interpretation arise even if provisions are specifically made, as 
in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), that « both language 
versions are equally authoritative»1. 
In this essay, I should like to concentrate on one term which in the 
English version of the Criminal Code of Canada is invariably used with one 
connotation but with quite a different one in the French version. The French 
version which is intended to provide an adequate, if not an accurate, 
translation of the original not only falls short of what may well appear to 
have been the intention of the legislator but in fact distorts that intention. 
In the Criminal Code, no provision is made as to which version should 
prevail in the event that the versions concerned differ in meaning. In 
practice, however, this problem should not arise because the Official 
Languages Act (1969) takes care of it by stipulating that «in construing an 
enactment, both its versions in the official languages are equally authentic »2. 
In applying this general principle, the Act goes on to state that should some 
incompatibility arise, within the legal system of the country, as to the 
concept, matter or thing in its expression in one version of the enactment, 
« preference shall be given to the version thereof that, according to the true 
spirit, intent and meaning of the enactment, best assures the attainment of its 
objects »3. 
The term that I am mainly concerned with here is « unlawfully » and its 
various forms in which it is found in the Criminal Code. I shall first discuss 
the meaning and implications of the term and will then apply my analysis to 
a vital section of the Criminal Code in an attempt to show the significant role 
it can play not so much in the Code itself as in Section 251 which deals with 
abortion legislation in Canada. 
1. The Meaning of «lawful» and «unlawful» 
The English version of the Criminal Code almost consistently uses the 
term « unlawful » or « unlawfully » when a section or sections intend to 
establish that some action or actions are incompatible with accepted social 
behaviour. For « unlawful », the French version invariably uses « illégal(e) » 
and occasionally «illégitime» or «illicite», which in English find their 
1. Canadian Charier of Rights and Freedoms (1982), s. 18(1). 
2. Official Languages Act, S.R.C. 1970, c. 0-2, s. 8(1). 
3. Ibid., s. 8(2)(d). 
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equivalent in « illegal », « illegitimate » and « illicit » respectively. All three 
terms are used to translate « unlawful » and yet none of them conveys the 
same meaning and implications that « unlawful » conveys. Their etymolo-
gical roots are, of course, common but usage has given them different 
meanings and different connotations to the extent that they are by no means 
synonymous with one another. They are not necessarily antonyms either. 
As a start, some dictionary definitions and explanations should be 
helpful. 
Robert's Dictionnaire alphabétique et analogique de la langue française 
provides clear definitions and copious illustrations of the various nuances in 
the meaning of these terms4. For example: 
Légal(e) : qui a valeur de loi, résulte de la loi, est conforme à la loi : « Ce qui est 
légal est conforme à la loi. Ce qui est légitime est conforme à l'équité. Un acte 
qui viole la loi ne peut jamais être légal : mais il peut être légitime en raison des 
circonstances ». 
Légitime: qui est fondé en droit, en équité. Légitime n'est synonyme de légal 
que dans certaines expressions plus rares de nos jours qu'autrefois... Légitime 
évoque l'idée d'un droit fondé sur la justice et l'équité, droit supérieur que le 
droit positif peut contredire. Conforme... au droit naturel. 
Licite : qui n'est défendu par aucune loi, aucune autorité établie : (a) « Ce qui 
est licite n'est pas nécessairement juste, ni même légitime. Choses condam-
nables qui deviennent licites » ; (b) « On est maître d'user ou de n'user pas des 
plaisirs permis ou licites ; on n'est pas maître de faire ou de ne pas faire ce qui 
est légitime ou légal, on doit le faire, on doit s'y conformer». 
As far as «lawful» or «unlawful» is concerned, other than the terms 
listed by Robert, there seems to be no corresponding word in French. 
The Oxford English Dictionary lists «justifiable » as one of the definitions 
of « lawful » (the others being « permissible » and « allowable »)5. Obviously, 
«justifiable» does not translate «légal(e)», «légitime» or «licite» and 
though in English «justifiable » and, perhaps, « allowable » come close to the 
English spirit, intent and meaning of « lawful », only indirectly, by a 
circuitous route, or by translating, adapting and interpreting «justifiable» 
can French approach the English meaning of « lawful ». 
Black's Law Dictionary provides a clear explanation of « lawful » and 
« legal » and in the process brings out the sharp differences that exist between 
them. He puts it as follows : 
The principal distinction between the terms « lawful » and « legal » is that the 
former contemplates the substance of law, the latter the form of law. To say of an 
4. Paul ROBERT, Dictionnaire alphabétique et analogique de la langue française, Paris, Société 
du Nouveau Littré, 1976, under légal(e), illégal(e) ; légitime, illégitime; licite, illicite. 
5. Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961, vol. VI. 
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act that it is « lawful » implies that it is authorized, sanctioned, or at any rate 
not forbidden, by law. To say that it is «legal» implies that it is done or 
performed in accordance with the forms and usages of law, or in a technical 
manner. In this sense « illegal » approaches the meaning of « invalid ». For 
example, a contract or will, executed without the required formalities, might be 
said to be invalid or illegal, but could not be described as unlawful. Further, the 
word «lawful» more clearly implies an ethical content than does «legal». The 
latter goes no further than to denote compliance, with positive, technical, or 
formal rules ; while the former usually imports a moral substance or ethical 
permissibility. A further distinction is that the word « legal » is used as the 
synonym of «constructive», which «lawful» is not. Thus «legal fraud» is 
fraud implied or inferred by law, or made out by construction. « Lawful fraud » 
would be a contradiction of terms. Again, « legal » is used as the antithesis of 
«equitable »...6 
Like Robert's, Black's analysis clearly shows that « lawful » and « legal » 
are substantially neither synonymous nor interchangeable. Furthermore, 
« lawful » has the added advantage provided by its suffix « full », hence 
«law-full », or «full of law », a connotation that is rich not so much in the 
letter as in the spirit and substance of the law : it provides a dimension which 
is absent in both the English and French versions of « legal », « legitimate » 
and «licit», namely, «an ethical content... a moral substance or ethical 
permissibility ». Aside from these considerations, the problem remains that 
« lawful » is not translatable by « légal(e) », « légitime » or « licite » ; however, 
in Robert's analysis « légitime » appears in effect to approach « lawful ». 
According to Larousse, the juridical meaning of «lawful» is «auto-
risé»'1, which seems to translate the spirit and intent of «lawful », if not the 
term itself, and which could well mean in effect « lawfully authorized ». In 
fact, the Criminal Code is not unaware of this form in that in several sections 
it uses « without lawful authority » and translates it by « sans autorisation 
légitime», «sans autorisation légale» or «sans excuse légitime»1. If the 
different French versions carry different connotations, which in the context 
should not, the English version does not. The English version is consistent 
both in meaning as well as in usage. 
Another meaningful phrase that the Code uses is «without lawful 
justification», «sans justification légitime». In some places, the term that 
appears is « without lawful justification or excuse », « sans justification ou 
6. Black's Law Dictionary, St. Paul, Minnesota, West Publishing Co., 1979, 5th edition, p. 797. 
Emphasis is mine. 
7. Larousse, Dictionnaire moderne français-anglais, Paris, Librairie Larousse, 1979. 
8. Cf. Criminal Code of Canada, ss. 46(2)(b), 247(2), 249(1), 327, 332(a), 334(2), 363, 373(d), 
377, 381(1), for «sans autorisation légitime»; ss. 71(l)(a), 258(a), for «sans autorisation 
légale» ; s. 102(3) for « sans excuse légitime». The references noted here are by no means 
exhaustive. 
P.J. MlCALLEF Abortion 1033 
excuse légitime ». However, this phrase is broader in concept than « without 
lawful authority ». The latter carries with it the notion that the person 
concerned is duly authorized, either by the law itself or by the nature of his 
profession, the perform the action in question and is therefore answerable to 
a legal or professional code9. 
In brief, combining the juridical meaning of « lawful » provided by 
Larousse with Robert's explanations of « légitime », without losing sight of 
the ethical dimension of « lawful » that Black speaks of, it seems to me that 
« unlawfully » finds its synonym in « without lawful authorization ». In 
French, it could be translated by « sans autorisation légitime » or some such 
equivalent term or terms. 
For the purposes of this study, it is the ethical dimension of the terms 
«lawful» and «unlawful» that is of interest and concern to us. 
2. « Unlawful » in the context of the Abortion Law 
The full thrust of the ethical content of « lawful » and its various forms 
can perhaps best be seen in its application to Section 251 of the Criminal 
Code which deals with abortion. Within the context of this section, I intend 
to explore the possibility whether an abortion law, expressed in ethical 
language, can safeguard society's concern for human life values and at the 
same time promote its respect for the freedom of choice of all those involved 
in abortion decisions. 
How, it may be asked, can an abortion law, expressed in ethical or for 
that matter in any language, safeguard human life values when it will surely 
fail in one vital element ? A simple answer to that question would be to say 
that the law should be cast not in sociological, economic or, as is the case 
with Canada's abortion legislation, in medical language 10. 
9. Ibid., ss. 159(2), 262, 308, 408, 410, 416, 417. Other parallel terms, phrases, or expressions 
that the English version of the Code uses are the following : « without justification » (« sans 
justification ») ; « without authority of law » (« sans l'autorité des lois ») ; « without reason-
able excuse » (« sans excuse valable ») ; « without reasonable justification » (« sans justifi-
cation raisonnable ») ; « without lawful excuse » (« sans une excuse légitime » or « sans excuse 
légitime»). The sections where these variations appear are too numerous to list here. It 
might be of some interest to note that while in the Code, « without lawful excuse » and 
« sans excuse légitime » are always interchangeable, « sans excuse légitime » is occasionally 
used for the English version of « without lawful authority » (see note 8) which adds to the 
seemingly haphazard manner in which some key terms have been translated. 
10. Under Canada's abortion law, viz. s. 251(4)(c), a therapeutic abortion may be performed in 
any accredited Canadian hospital after a minimum of a three-doctor therapeutic abortion 
committee has certified that a woman's continued pregnancy « would or would be likely to 
endanger her life or health ». 
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Abortion laws cast in sociological, economic or medical language are 
those laws that specify the grounds for which abortions may be performed. 
Such laws could well be found to be morally objectionable because, among 
other things, they decide in advance, thereby establishing the principle, that 
those fetal lives which are in conflict with some aspect of the mother's life or 
health have next to no protection from the law. And since it is far safer today 
to terminate a pregnancy, in the first trimester, than to carry it to term, 
theoretically every pregnancy constitutes a danger to the mother's life or 
health and hence theoretically every pregnancy passes the medical test, and 
consequently the legal one, for termination. 
Within the broad framework of current abortion legislation, including 
Canada's, Dr. W.H. Allemang of Toronto, argues that, once any abortion is 
approved and performed, subsequent refusals to terminate unwanted preg-
nancies are discriminatory and contravene the rights of the individual ". One 
may or may not, of course, agree with his contention but it is typical of the 
kind of opinion that necessarily emerges from a law that makes a priori 
judgments on the basis of which fetal lives may be destroyed. 
On the other hand, the superiority of ethical language over sociological, 
economic or medical language in abortion is underscored by the fact that 
abortion is an act highly charged with moral overtones. Though no law need 
express moral concerns, it should nonetheless reflect the general feelings of 
society as a whole while not brushing aside the concerns of those who need 
access to it, particularly when the matter we are dealing with cuts across all 
denominational and moral considerations and does not and cannot receive 
universal approval. 
To suggest, therefore, an abortion law expressed in ethical rather than 
in other terms, one would have to go back to what is now known as « the old 
abortion law ». 
2.1. Britain's Offences Against the Person Act, 1861 
In essence, the old abortion law is Britain's Offences Against the Person 
Act, 1861, which up to 1953 had substantially corresponded to Canada's law 
and which until the sixties had also inspired abortion legislation across the 
U.S. The 1861 Act reads, in part, as follows: 
Every woman, being with child, who, with intent to procure her own 
miscarriage, shall unlawfully administer to herself any poison or other noxious 
thing, or shall unlawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever with 
the like intent, and whosoever, with intent to procure the miscarriage of any 
11. W.H. ALLEMANG, « Therapeutic Abortion : Some Considerations of the Current Problem », 
National Conference on Abortion, Toronto, 1972. 
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woman, whether she be or not with child, shall unlawfully administer to her or 
cause to be taken by her any poison or other noxious thing, or shall unlawfully 
use any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent, shall be 
guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof, shall be liable... to be kept in 
penal servitude for life.12 
It should be noted that it is not clear whether or not abortion was a 
crime at common law13. Perhaps this doubt explains, at least in part, Black's 
comment on « unlawfully » : « It was formerly necessary », he writes, « when 
the crime did not exist at common law (...) but was unnecessary whenever the 
crime existed at common law and was manifestly illegal. »'4 
At any rate, the frequent use of the term « unlawfully » is, in the context, 
very significant in that the 1861 Act had quite clearly protected fetal life. But 
on its face it had not protected fetal life exclusively. By its appropriate 
insertion of « unlawfully » — or its use would have been redundant and 
would have served no purpose at all — it had also respected the freedoms 
and choices of doctors and women. This dual respect for life and for the 
freedom of choice of individuals was assured by two facts : (a) that the 1861 
Act had specified no grounds for which abortions may be performed; 
and (b) that the Act contained the all-important term « unlawfully ». 
Though it did not elaborate upon the term, the medical and legal professions 
took it to imply that, under certain conditions, the Act envisaged that some 
abortions were lawful after all, and therefore legally permissible, provided 
they were performed in good faith and in compliance with the conditions 
specified in the Act. The Act was obviously silent regarding which abortions 
were lawful. Eventually and painfully, it became evident that there might be 
instances which medically as well as legally justified termination of pregnan-
cies. It was left to the good faith of the individuals most intimately concerned 
with abortion decisions to assess at the moment, and not in advance, 
whether or not any particular abortion was indeed « law-full ». 
2.2. Section 251 of Canada's Criminal Code 
Until 1953, the present Section 251 (then Section 303; subsequently 
Section 237) of the Criminal Code had also contained the term « unlawfully ». 
At the time, the section concerned read as follows : 
Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life 
who, with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, whether she is or is 
12. Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, 24 and 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 58. Emphasis is mine. 
13. Cf. Regina v. Whitchurch, (1890), 24 Q.B.D. 420, cited in Martin's Criminal Code of Canada, 
Toronto, Cartwright & Sons, Ltd, 1955, p. 446. 
14. Black's Law Dictionary, supra, note 6, p. 1377. 
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not with child, unlawfully administers to her or causes to be taken by her any 
drug or other noxious thing, or unlawfully uses on her any instrument or other 
means whatsoever with the like intent.'5 
However, when in 1953 the Code was revised, the sections dealing with 
abortion were not discussed or debated at all but, for no clear reason other 
than that a drafting error had been made, the term «unlawfully» was 
removed in the 1953 edition of the Code 16. Nonetheless, again for no known 
reason, it was retained in Section 252 which specifies quite clearly that it is 
unlawful for any one to supply a drug or any instrument or noxious thing for 
the purposes of procuring abortion n . 
The omission produced within the medical and legal professions two 
schools of thought : one that abortion had suddenly become illegal, literally 
by the stroke of the pen ; the other, that since no debate was held on the 
subject and no legislation had been adopted in any way, it was simply, to put 
it crudely, «business as usual». The latter position was reinforced by what 
was known as the « Bourne Principle ». The fact remained, however, that the 
omission had created an ambivalent and anomalous situation and no small 
hardship. One medical commentator (who also had legal training) had put it 
this way : « The omission of unlawfully in 1953 kicked the props from the 
legal defence established by Bourne. »18 In spite of this unclear situation, 
therapeutic abortions were continued to be performed mainly on the 
strength of the Bourne Principle ". 
2.3. Rex v. Bourne (1938) 
The Bourne Principle which gave renewed force and effect to « unlaw-
fully » and which was respected on both sides of the Atlantic without 
question arose, albeit obliquely, out of the following incident. 
15. Cf. Tremeear's Annotated Criminal Code, Toronto, The Carswell Co., Ltd, 1944, 5 th edition, 
s. 303. Emphasis is mine. 
16. Cf. Minutes of the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, March 13, 1969, p. 345-
346; House of Commons (Canada) Debates, March 5, 1971, p. 4015. 
17. The retention of « unlawfully » in s. 252 raises a host of questions. For instance, might it not 
be taken to imply that there may well be instances when supplying « a drug or other noxious 
thing or an instrument or thing » for the purpose of procuring an abortion could be lawful? 
Might it not be argued that it anticipates the abortifacient drugs or injections when these 
become available and that supplying them may well be, like abortion in the past, lawful 
after all? 
18. Cf. J. LEDERMAN, «The Doctor, Abortion and the Law: A Medico-Legal Dilemma», 
Canadian Medical Association Journal, 87 (1962) 216. Emphasis is author's; Graham E. 
PARKER, «Bill C-150: Abortion Reform», (1969) 11 Criminal Law Quarterly, 267. 
19. Dr. G.B. MAUGHAN of McGill University and Montreal's Royal Victoria Hospital, as cited 
in a Canadian Press Report, « Cross-Canada Survey on Therapeutic Abortions », March 19, 
1970. 
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In 1938, Dr. Aleck Bourne, an eminent British gynecologist, was 
charged with performing an abortion on a fourteen-year old girl who had 
been gang-raped by a number of horse-guardsmen. The rape occurred on 
April 27, 1938, and the abortion was performed seven weeks later on June 
14. 
Until its sweeping revisions in 1967, Britain's legal provisions concerning 
abortion were contained in the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861. The 
1861 Act was very carefully worded in that its framers had inserted the word 
« unlawfully » in some very appropriate places. But by design or necessity, 
the Act in general and « unlawfully » in particular lacked definition. 
Consequently, what before very long became the accepted medical practice 
— particularly when the procedure was considered necessary to save the 
mother's life — was to destroy the child in utero shortly before birth or even 
at the onset of labour. This form of child destruction was not strictly 
abortion because at this stage the fetus is quite viable and it had gone beyond 
the stage to which the term « abortion » normally applies. Nor was it 
infanticide/homicide because these terms were, as they still are, applicable to 
the human being and the unborn child is not, in law, a human being20. 
The period between viability and birth was a sort of a « no-man's land » 
and since this medical and legal gap was covered by no Act, Bill or Statute, a 
step forward towards bringing that no-man's land under legal control was 
taken in 1929 when the English Statute created a special offence of child 
destruction, known as the Infant Life Preservation Act, 1929. Originally 
proposed in England by various bills, dated as far back as 1867 and 1874 and 
by the Royal Commission's Report of the Criminal Code, 1879, it was never 
enacted into law until 1929. Canada, however, filled the legal gap between 
viability and birth soon after this Report became available to the Parliament 
of Canada, which in 1892 it adopted with some changes and modifications as 
its Criminal Code. 
The Infant Life Preservation Act, which corresponds to Canada's 
Section 221 of the Criminal Code, was primarily intended to prevent children 
from being destroyed at birth, once they had been spared abortion. 
However, the Act provided a very important limitation : « No person shall be 
found guilty of an offence under this section unless it is proved that the act 
which caused the death of the child was not done in good faith for the 
purpose only of preserving the life of the mother ». 
The 1861 and 1929 Acts were patently unrelated because they covered 
two quite distinct and different periods in fetal development. Nonetheless, 
20. Cf. s. 206. 
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so-called therapeutic abordons were performed, no doubt in fear and 
trembling, on the strength of the term « unlawfully » of 1861 and possibly on 
the basis of a somewhat convoluted interpretation of the saving clause of 
1929. 
Dr. Bourne had been performing therapeutic abortions for some years 
without fear of legal reprisals but when the rape case occurred in 1938 he was 
determined to obtain a judicial declaration of the law's provisions so much 
so that he publicly announced his intentions of performing the abortion for 
reasons other than that the life of the mother was in danger. With the 
consent of the girl's parents and without fee, he performed the operation in 
the open wards of St. Mary's Hospital, London. He put his head on the 
block, as it were, and no sooner had he terminated the pregnancy of the 
fourteen-year old girl than he was arrested and charged with committing a 
felony. 
Dr. Bourne was charged under the provisions of Section 58 of the 
Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, the abortion Act. To strengthen his 
and the medical profession's understanding of « unlawfully », his line of 
defence proceeded in part on the saving clause of the 1929 Act (where the 
exception is limited to the preservation of the mother's life), and read into 
«unlawfully» of the 1861 Act the same exception covered by the 1929 Act, 
even though the 1929 Act was not related to abortion as such. Once he did 
that, his defence interpreted the preservation-of-life clause in a more 
extended sense to include as well the safeguarding of the mother's health, 
physical or mental. He argued that no clear-cut distinction could be drawn 
between the purpose of saving the mother's physical life and the preservation 
of her mental health, which was the indication in the present case. It was 
Dr. Bourne's intention « to establish in the eyes of the law that mental health 
was just as important as physical health, and in certain cases perhaps even 
more so »21. He contended that there are many vague and almost indefinable 
conditions which, as serious dangers to health though not to life, are much 
more important than many straight cases of heart or chest disease. The latter 
often suffer little or no real depreciation of health and they carry the label of 
a named disease which is readily accepted by laymen ; the former class, by 
reason of the lack of concise clinical definition, may not be readily 
convincing cases in any subsequent investigation. It is these patients who 
represented the real problem22. 
21. Aleck BOURNE, «Rex v. Bourne», Lancet, II (1938) 280. 
22. For a full account of the Bourne case, see « Comment : Artificial Abortion Following 
Rape », Lancet, II (1938) 99; Lilian WYLES, A Woman at Scotland Yard, London, Gollanzc, 
1952, p. 221 et seq. For the socio-legal aspects: Aleck W. BOURNE, «Social Aspects of 
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In his summing-up on the Bourne case, Mr. Justice MacNaghten told the 
jury : « If the doctor is of the opinion, on reasonable grounds and with 
adequate knowledge, that the probable consequence of the continuance of 
the pregnancy will be to make the woman a physical or mental wreck, the 
jury are quite entitled to take the view that the doctor who, in those 
circumstances, and in the honest belief, operates, is operating for the 
purpose of preserving the life of the woman ». They were further instructed 
to take a prudent view of the significance of the preservation-of-life clause. 
In his words: «The law is not that the doctor has got to wait until the 
unfortunate woman is in peril of immediate death and then at the last 
moment snatch her from the jaws of death.... Nobody suggests that the 
operation only becomes legal when a patient is dead »23. 
Dr. Bourne's line of defence, coupled with the Court's interpretation of 
his argument, became the celebrated « Bourne Principle », a major landmark 
in the history of abortion law reform. In brief, the principle established 
beyond reasonable doubt that it is sufficient to operate in the honest belief 
in cases where the woman, in no immediate danger of losing her life, might 
otherwise be left impaired, physically, mentally or psychologically; or, to 
paraphrase Canada's abortion language, where continuation of the preg-
nancy would proximately or remotely threaten or somehow or other would 
appear to be capable of threatening the existential totality of the woman 
herself and in relation to her family, her total environment and the 
community in which she lives and brings forth her child. Another way of 
looking at Bourne is to say that there might be circumstances, as in fact there 
are, justifying a termination of pregnancy which cannot be cast in the mould 
of law, but which provide society with an opportunity to catch a glimpse of 
what Daniel Callahan calls « the inner world of a woman — her goals in life, 
her perception of the world, her own felt needs »24. Furthermore, all proof to 
the contrary, that an abortion was not performed to preserve the life or 
health (physical or mental) of the mother or that the doctor did not in good 
faith believe the abortion was necessary, lay with the state. In the cir-
cumstances, this was quite a heavy burden of proof25. 
Abortion », British MedicalJournal, I (1939) 408 ; Glanville WILLIAMS, The Sanctity of Life 
and the Criminal Law; London, Faber & Faber, 1958, p. 152-176. For a critical comment on 
the legal and medical case: The Tablet, 172 (1938) 103. 
23. Rex v. Bourne, (1938) 3 All E.R. 615. 
24. Daniel CALLAHAN, Abortion: Law, Choice and Morality, New York, MacMillan, 1970, 
p. 479. 
25. Besides becoming the operative principle in Britain, Canada and the U.S., the Bourne 
Principle was subsequently upheld in other cases. See in particular: People v. Ballard, 167 
Cal. App. 2d 803, 335 P.2d 204 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959), which appeared to reinforce Bourne 
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3. The Ethical Implications of the old Abortion Law 
The legal, medical and not least ethical ramifications that surrounded 
«unlawfully» of the 1861 Act and which Bourne brought out with the 
assistance of the saving clause of the 1929 Act were far-reaching. It became 
abundantly clear that besides recognizing those facts that every abortion law 
recognizes — namely, that abortion is a fact of life and is likely to remain so 
for as many generations in the future as there have been in the past ; that 
with or without a liberalized law, possibly even with a greatly permissive 
one, the illegal rate of abortions will not necessarily be reduced ; that if a 
doctor wants to perform an abortion he will perform it, as much as any 
woman seeking an abortion will obtain it, legally or illegally — the 1861 Act 
or the old law recognized at the same time other factors in a way no other 
law does. 
First of all, it was based on a fundamental common law principle : 
society's commitment to the protection of human life from deliberate or 
negligent attack. By not establishing a hierarchy of values involving the 
mother and her unborn child, it inserted no a priori principle in our legal 
system justifying the elimination of life. Thus while the old law protected 
unborn children, it provided at the same time enough freedom to those 
intimately involved in abortion decisions to take such decisions responsibly 
and judiciously. By so providing, it preserved the dignity of women and 
doctors and sought as rational a control of abortion as possible, without at 
the same time creating an abortion charter : while the old law demanded 
women and doctors to pause and think if the abortion in question was 
indeed « law-full », the reformed legislation anticipates their judgment in 
practically all particular cases of abortion. 
Its wisdom and virtue lay precisely in the fact that it was expressed not 
in socio-economic or medical language but in ethical language. All that it 
by implying that the mother's life must be considered in relation to its quality as well as its 
duration, was based solely on the statutory law which then provided only the exception 
« when necessary to preserve the mother's life » : « There is a presumption of necessity when 
an abortion is performed by a licensed physician, which presumption cannot be overturned 
merely by showing prior good health... Surely the abortion statute... does not mean that the 
peril of life be imminent. It ought to be enough that the dangerous condition be potentially 
present, even though its full development might be delayed to a greater or less extent » ; in 
U.S. v. Vuilch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.C.D.C. Nov. 1969), the Court stated : « We are unable 
to believe that Congress intended that a physician be required to prove his innocence. We 
therefore hold that, under 22 D.C. Code 201, the burden in on the prosecution to plead and 
prove that an abortion was not "necessary for the preservation of the mother's life or 
health"»; see also, People v. Gallardo, 41 Cal. 2d, 57, 257 P.2d (1953); Commonwealth v. 
Brunelle, 341 Mass. 675, 171 N.E. 2d 850 (1961). 
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demanded was good faith on the part of those who perform or seek abortion. 
Designed to serve a specific class of people in very disturbing and perplexing 
circumstances, it, consequently, demanded that it be put to work. Further-
more, by placing its trust in the good faith of professional people, it made the 
conscience clause irrelevant and it could also take care of the day, which no 
other type of law does, when the abortifacient pill becomes available. Since 
the pill would presumably require a doctor's prescription — and a lot of good 
faith — the cumbersome mechanism erected to have an abortion approved 
and performed would become unnecessary. 
By not putting all these concerns and all these needs in so many words, 
the old law avoided serious conflicts over the grounds for abortion and the 
terminology to be used and, in fact, rendered all discussion of specific 
indications superfluous. 
I am not suggesting that all these permutations and combinations in 
abortion laws were necessarily in the legislator's mind when the law was first 
enacted. In fact, they were not. I dare say, however, that they could be 
subsumed under such a meaningful term as « unlawfully », even if a law 
expressed in such terms does not in any way resolve the problem of the 
morality of abortion as such. But it could well make abortion laws ethically 
acceptable. What I am, therefore, suggesting is that the answer to the 
question — what indications should an abortion law contain, if it should 
contain any indications at all — may perhaps be found in history, by 
reviewing how the combined efforts of the legislature, the medical profession 
and the judiciary, tacitly, even if at times belligerently, working together 
towards a better understanding and practice of the law, have over the past 
one hundred years sought to bring out the implications of the law. Another 
way of putting it is to say that an abortion law had better say nothing, other 
than what the old law had said, and had better be left to the good faith of 
those most intimately affected by the law, even if in some cases there might 
be a de facto honouring of the law in the breach rather than in the 
observance. 
Certain abuses in the applications of any abortion law are unavoidable, 
but abuses are probably preferable to a wholesale social system of legalized 
abortion. « The criminal law is not futile », writes John Finnis referring to 
abortion legislation, « if it succeeds in doing little more than manifesting 
society's continuing commitment to its preferred values »26. A participant at 
the 1967 Washington Conference on Abortion put it as follows: «The 
abortion laws use the didactive power of the law to uphold this negative 
26. John M. FINNIS, «Three Schemes of Regulation », in John T. NOONAN, Jr., The Morality of 
Abortion, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970, p. 179. 
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judgment upon abortion while still providing a means of grace, an outlet for 
people who are in embarassing circumstances. »27 
Given the climate in which abortion legislation has been adopted — in 
Canada, the debate had the « nation bleeding »28 — it is difficult to conceive 
of any abortion law, other than the old law, that would have so responsibly 
manifested society's commitment to its preferred values and that at the same 
time is so concerned with all or most of the rights claimed in abortion. In its 
own way, the old law had a didactive value about it which is absent in the 
current abortion laws. Since « unlawfully » gave it « a moral substance, an 
ethical permissibility », practical concessions made through it were not 
compromises of principle : society's preferred values were built into the law. 
One might note in passing that, as opposed to this approach, Canada's law 
considers abortion illegal (not unlawful) in Section 251 (1), (2) and (3) and 
then goes on to explain that, nonetheless, it may be done legally if certain 
conditions are adhered to. 
Other than saying that the old law appears to have been a good law 
from the ethical standpoint, the considerations I have put forward should by 
no means suggest that the old law was a perfect law, that it was immune from 
abuses, or that it was even remotely an attempt to make, as it were, everyone 
happy. Callahan repeatedly points out that there is hardly an abortion law 
that is exempt from problems. One law may nullify some problems and 
reduce the impact of others, but in the process the same law may create its 
own particular set of problems. 
Ironically, the old law's greatest virtue turned out to be its greatest 
weakness, namely, the vagueness of its key-term «unlawfully». It has been 
stated to this effect that « a statute which either forbids or requires the doing 
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily 
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential 
of due process »29, a principle that was increasingly upheld in abortion 
debates and decisions to invalidate the old abortion statutes. Closer to home, 
Claude Armand-Sheppard, Q.C., also expressed the same concern, referring 
27. Robert E. COOKE et ai, The Terrible Choice: The Abortion Dilemma, New York, Bantam 
Books, 1968, p. 63. A psychologist, also present at the Washington Conference on Abortion, 
stated : « We have to be concerned with the entire ethical fabric of what's happening to this 
society — drugs, sexual behaviour, homosexuality. People need rules badly ; what they 
want is a set of rules where at least they believe most people share that set of values », ibid., 
p. 62. 
28. Cf. Debates, May 8, 1969, p. 8503-8505, for Eldon Woolliams' eloquent speech on the 
antagonism created in Parliament by the abortion debate. 
29. Connelly v. Gen. Const. Co., 269 U.S., 385, 391, cited in Commonwealth v. Brunelle, see note 
25; Lametta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451. 
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to «unlawfully» as a term which provides «fodder for Supreme Court 
decisions and not very helpful in practice »30. 
But on the other side of the ledger, there are several declarations 
upholding the old law. In one case, for instance, the dissenting judges of the 
Supreme Court of California (3 against 4) registered a strong protest : « One 
would think», they wrote, «that the English language which has been the 
sensitive instrument of our system of law for over 500 years has lost, by the 
mere passage of time, all capacity for clarity of expression »31. Regarding this 
particular decision, Louisell and Noonan make the following comment : 
The statute which was invalidated in 1969 had been in substantially the same 
form for over a century... It is usual for a statute to be somewhat indefinite and 
to be progressively clarified by judicial decisions. The majority of the court in 
this case seemed to have thought that judicial decisions had made the statute 
progressively unclear so that finally there was nothing left but to say that it was 
unintelligible. 
About the same time that California invalidated its law, the Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts and the Supreme Court of New Jersey found parallel phrases in 
their statutes on abortion to be clearly understandable by ordinary persons. It 
is difficult to believe that what is comprehensible to ordinary men in 
Massachusetts and New Jersey is not comprehensible to ordinary men in 
California.32 
Indeed, the old law was no more vague than the new legislation's 
terminology — health, a difficult social situation, any threat to a woman's 
total well-being, etc. — terms which, vague, undefined and undefinable 
though they be, are being used to justify abortions and the setting-up of 
abortion clinics. After all, the Criminal Code abounds in what Jerome Frank 
calls «weasel words, loose words with vague meanings »33. Consequently, it 
is not an irregular practice to retain rules or laws formulated in such 
language while providing them with a different interpretation than hitherto 
given. Indeed, if legislators were to bind their own laws and the Courts by 
precise, inflexible terminology, they would be defeating themselves. Ambi-
guities in legal terminology do not usually result from careless draftsmanship 
but rather from the fact that it is impossible for the legislator to anticipate or 
envisage with any sense of accuracy the numerous circumstances which can 
come within the scope of any particular law. Legislators have, therefore, no 
30. Minutes, March 27, 1969, p. 759, 766. 
31. People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 210, 80 Cal., 1969, p. 370. 
32. David W. LOUISELL and John T. NOONAN, Jr., «Constitutional Balance», in NOONAN, 
supra, note 26, p. 238, 240. In support of their opinion, they cite State v. Moretti, 52 N.J. 
182, 244 A.2d 499 (1968): «Without lawful justification»; and Kudish v. Board of 
Registration in Medicine, 248 N.E. 2d 264 (1969): «Unlawfully». See notes 8 and 9. 
33. Jerome FRANK, Courts on Trial, New York, Atheneum Publishers, 1969, p. 277. 
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choice but to draft their laws in general terms and allow the courts to 
interpret and implement them by judicial decisions on the strength of a right 
principle drawn from the law or which somehow emerges from the law. For 
instance, when does « shall unlawfully », in the present context, mean « may 
lawfully » ? Or when does « unlawfully » mean « without legitimate autho-
rization », « without being lawfully authorized », or « without lawful justifi-
cation » ? Glib answers defeat the whole purpose of legislative procedures 
and intentions34. 
It is a matter of regret that a phrase like « without legitimate autho-
rization » and similar expressions found their way into the Criminal Code 
involving actions ranging from spying to altering a weapon's serial number 
and did not find their way into the sections dealing with such a vital matter 
as abortion. 
The charge that the old law had given no directions as to which 
abortions were said to be legal and which illegal (as the new legislation is 
supposed to do and to have done) might have been valid in 1861 when the 
law was first enacted. But then the terminology used was « unlawful » and 
not « illegal » and after a 100-year old experience, after Bourne, after the long 
arduous political debate and the publicity that accompanied and followed it, 
by medical practice, by court rulings and interpretations, «unlawfully» can 
hardly be said to lack definition, to provide no guidelines, to be unintelligible 
to men of common intelligence. By having the implications of « unlawfully » 
brought out in several ways, the old law had been given a specific content 
amply demonstrating that a qualified physician operating within the terms of 
the law could quite « law-fully » perform an abortion if he in good faith 
believed that the abortion was necessary35. 
In a special report prepared prior to the enactment of Britain's Abortion 
Act of 1967, the Council of the Royal College of Gynecologists and 
Physicians stated that «the present situation commends itself to most 
gynecologists in that it leaves them free to act in what they consider to be the 
best interests of each individual patient... »36. After the enactment of the 1967 
Act, it was in fact observed that if the abortion situation had improved in 
34. In his Treatise on Law, I -I I, q. 96, a. 6, Aquinas made very much the same point which is 
worth recalling here : « No man is so wise as to be able to take account of every single case ; 
wherefore he is not able sufficiently to express in words all those things that are suitable for 
the end he has in view. And even if a lawgiver were able to take all the cases into 
consideration, he ought not to mention them all, in order to avoid confusion, but should 
frame the law according to that which is of most common occurrence ». Cf. also ARISTOTLE, 
Nicomachean Ethics, 1137a31-b27. 
35. Cf. Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 315 Mass. 394; v. Nason, 252 Mass. 545; v. Brunelle, 341 
Mass. 675. 
36. «Legalized Abortion», British Medical Journal, I (1966) 850. 
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England, this improvement was due not so much to the effect of the law itself 
as to the debate which preceded it and to the deliberations and explanations 
that had been made. At the Arden House Conference on Abortion, it was also 
generally agreed that it was « virtually unknown » that a licensed physician 
who had performed an abortion under hospital jurisdiction had ever been 
prosecuted37. Or as Dr. Milton Helpern put it : « Law enforcement agencies, 
as a rule, have not questioned the propriety and judgment of reputable 
physicians who decide to perform an abortion for therapeutic reasons in a 
reputable hospital... even though there may not have been uniform medical 
agreement as to the indications for the abortion. »38 Dr. Helpern is here 
referring to the New York experience. Dr. Alan Guttmacher, a staunch 
supporter of abortion on demand, had made similar observations about 
Maryland39. 
Conclusion 
Underlying my analysis is the fundamental difference that we must 
recognize between, on the one hand, the moral worth of abortion as such 
and, on the other, the moral worth of an abortion law. A discussion of this 
problem is obviously beyond the scope of this essay. It should be noted, 
however, that it is at this point that we must begin to distinguish, wisely and 
honestly, what is immoral and what, notwithstanding, may be lawful or 
legally permissible. The morality of abortion may indeed rest on the value of 
fetal life and in this respect society's fundamental concern should forever 
remain the protection of human life wherever and however it is found. But in 
the context of contemporary demands and life-styles one must make a 
sincere decision as to how the law can best safeguard and promote this value 
as the central issue in abortion or as one of the major issues without creating 
an abortion-oriented society. 
Perhaps the law can best safeguard this value by reinserting the ethical 
dimension into the law. During the parliamentary debate on abortion in 
1969, Mr. Eldon Woolliams attempted to do just that by proposing the 
following version as a working formula : 
Every one who, with intent to procure the miscarriage of a female person 
whether or not she is pregnant, unlawfully uses any means for the purpose of 
carrying out his intention is guilty of an indictable offence...40 
37. Mary S. CALDERONE (ed.), Abortion in the United States, New York, Hoeber-Harper, 1958, 
p. 40. 
38. Milton HELPERN, «The Problem of Criminal Abortion», Quarterly Review of Surgery, 
Obstetrics and Gynecology, 16 (1959) 232. 
39. Cited in A.E. HELLEGERS, «Law and the Common Good», Commonweal, 86 (1967) 421. 
40. Minutes, March 27, 1969, p. 796. Woolliams' proposal may be translated as follows : « Est 
coupable d'un acte criminel... quiconque, avec l'intention de procurer l'avortement d'une 
1046 Les Cahiers de Droit (1982) 23 C. de D. 1029 
Professor Alan W. Mewett of Osgoode Hall considered abortion 
legislation through the same perspective as Woolliams, as did many legal 
minds of the country41. Called before the Standing Committee on Justice 
and Legal Affairs, Mewett said : « If instead of these amendments you merely 
inserted the word "unlawfully", you would then make it quite clear that the 
principles adopted in Rex v. Bourne would also apply to Canada. »42 
The insertion of « unlawfully » would, in fact, have done no more than 
readopt the law as it was prior to 1953 and in effect codify the Bourne 
Principle which would have allowed reasonable latitude when termination of 
pregnancy is indicated43. Furthermore, it would have left the matter both 
within the medical profession — to decide on medical and ethical grounds 
whether in the profession's good faith an abortion is therapeutically 
necessary or otherwise justifiable in the best interests of the patient — as well 
as within the legal profession and the judiciary in the event that some 
particular case of abortion might be considered « unlaw-full ». Each case of 
abortion would thus be evaluated, therapeutically on its own merits, legally 
on the basis of « unlawfully ». 
Had that law been allowed its proverbial day in court to which it was 
entitled, it probably would have withstood the test that it would have been 
subjected to. Regrettably, it was thrown out of court. Bourne, however, was 
not and that was at a time when the Court had hardly any jurisprudence on 
abortion to rely on other than the term « unlawfully ». 
personne du sexe féminin, qu'elle soit enceinte ou non, emploie sans autorisation légitime 
quelque moyen pour réaliser son intention ». 
41. Cf. Debates, April 28, 1969, p. 8089, where Woolliams stated that the abortion provisions in 
Bill C-150 are «not only beyond my comprehension but also beyond the comprehension of 
many professors teaching criminal law in Universities in Canada ». 
42. Minutes, March 13, 1969, p. 350-351, 370, 374-375. 
43. Cf. Norman ST. JOHN-STEVAS, «The English Experience», America, 117 (1967) 707; 
Alan W. MEWETT, « Notes and Comments : Bill C-195 », (1967-68) 10 Crim. L.Q., 385 (Bill 
C-195 was the original number of Bill C-150, popularly known as the «Omnibus Bill»); 
Debates, April 25, 1969, p. 7968; April 28, 1969, p. 8089. 
